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1 
COPYRIGHT LAW—UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF MUSIC WARRANT 
ITS OWN SYSTEM: HOW ADOPTING THE INTENDED AUDIENCE TEST CAN 
SAVE MUSIC COPYRIGHT LITIGATION 
 
Alison P. Wynn* 
 
Music has been a crux of everyday life for decades.  Almost ninety-
one percent of the United States population listens to music, and 
spends more than twenty-four hours a week listening to their favorite 
songs—making music one of the top forms of entertainment for most 
Americans.  Music has unique qualities that differentiate it from other 
works of authorship, which must be recognized by copyright law. 
The current subjective measure used to determine unlawful 
appropriation of copyrightable work is not sufficient.  A minority of 
courts have expanded the current “ordinary observer” standard to 
consider the “intended audience” of the specific work—claiming the 
“ordinary observer” lacks the necessary skill and expertise to 
properly test for subjective copying. 
This Note will argue that the Intended Audience Test should apply in 
all music copyright infringement cases as a better measure for 
unlawful appropriation.  A change in the subjective test is necessary 
to foster a more accurate measure of malicious copying versus music 
production with use of musical influences; to align with today’s 
landscape of individualized and highly personal consumption of 
music; and to better promote the main purpose of copyright law, 
which is to foster the greatest amount and highest quality of creative 
works in the public domain. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The hit song “Blurred Lines,” by Robin Thicke, Pharrell Williams, 
and T.I., was at the center of a media frenzy in early 2015 due to the artists’ 
alleged infringement on the Marvin Gaye classic, “Got to Give It Up.”1  
Faced with the threat of multiple infringement claims from Gaye’s family, 
the trio filed a preemptive complaint for declaratory relief in 2013, seeking 
confirmation that their song did not violate Gaye’s copyrightable 
material.2  In the complaint, the artists detailed their respect and 
admiration for Marvin Gaye, and their intent to “evoke an era” in the 
production of the song—not maliciously copy Gaye’s work.3 
Gaye’s family fought back by filing numerous counterclaims 
detailing Thicke’s public admission to using Gaye’s song as inspiration 
during production, the media coverage commenting on the similarities 
between the songs, and an expert musicologist report listing a variety of 
supposedly similar compositional features between the works.4  Gaye’s 
original copyright protection extended only to the music underlying “Got 
to Give it Up,” however, and not the sound recording, as the registered 
copyright was based on a “lead sheet” of musical notation.5  Aside from 
the lyrics, the lead sheet contained “virtually no original musical 
expression, and it is immediately apparent upon seeing it that its symbolic 
notation is a transcription by a literate musician of a sound recording of 
quasi-improvised vocalizing involving no more than a handful of 
pitches.”6  Regardless, the District Court denied Thicke and Williams’ 
preemptive claim and motion for summary judgment, and permitted the 
Gaye family’s counterclaim for copyright infringement to proceed.7  The 
 
1.  Kory Grow, The ‘Blurred Lines’ Legal Battle Explained: What Comes Next, ROLLING 
STONE (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www rollingstone.com/music/news/the-blurred-lines-legal-
battle-explained-what-comes-next-20150320 [https://perma.cc/D7LF-MZ9M].  
2.  Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 2, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. 13-
06004 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
3.  Id. (“Being reminiscent of a ‘sound’ is not copyright infringement.  The intent in 
producing ‘Blurred Lines’ was to evoke an era.  In reality, the Gaye defendants are claiming 
ownerships of an entire genre, as opposed to a specific work, and Bridgeport is claiming the 
same work.”) (emphasis added).  
4.  Defendants’ Counterclaims at 15–16, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. 13-
06004 (C.D. Cal. 2013).  
5.  Charles Cronin, I Hear America Suing: Music Copyright Infringement in the Era of 
Electronic Sound, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1230 n.227 (2015) (“A ‘lead sheet’ is a score, in 
manuscript or printed form, that shows only the melody, the basic harmonic structure, and the 
lyrics (if any) of a composition.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
6.  Id. at 1230.  
7.  See Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK, 2014 WL 7877773 
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014). 
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trial began in February of 2015.8 
During trial, Williams took credit for most of the production process 
of “Blurred Lines,” claiming Thicke was only present after Williams 
produced the majority of the music and wrote the lyrics.9  Williams 
testified that the 1970s feeling of Marvin Gaye’s sound inspired “Blurred 
Lines,” but pleaded that he never copied his work—adding that Gaye was 
“one of the ones we look up to the most,” since he had grown up with 
Motown music.10  Further, when asked if his song has a similar “feel” to 
Gaye’s classic, Williams replied, “feel . . . not infringement.”11 
After more than a year of legal battles, the jury ordered Williams and 
Thicke to pay $7.4 million12 to the Gaye family for the infringement of 
“Got to Give it Up.”13  The large damage award, the immense media 
coverage, and the lengthy and detailed judicial process all demonstrate 
today’s relevancy of music copyright law.14 
In its aftermath, the “Blurred Lines” case “prompted debate in music 
and copyright circles about the difference between plagiarism and 
homage, as well as what impact the verdict [will] have on how musicians 
create work in the future.”15  Critics of the current copyright system 
suggests that, “[g]iven that the only commonalities between the works 
were non-copyrightable generic musical and sonic elements, it appears 
that the verdict was based mainly on the jurors’ opprobrium of the 
 
8.  See Austin Siegemund-Broka, ‘Blurred Lines’ Trial Opens As Jurors Hear Dueling 
Arguments About What’s At Stake, BILLBOARD (Feb. 24, 2015), 
http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/6480482/blurred-lines-trial-robin-thicke-pharrell 
[https://perma.cc/Q46E-TNT5]. 
9.  Ben Sisario & Noah Smith, Pharrell Williams Acknowledges Similarity to Gaye Song 
in ‘Blurred Lines’ Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/05/business/media/pharrell-williams-acknowledges-
similarity-to-marvin-gaye-song-in-blurred-lines-case html [https://perma.cc/Z6F8-Y7CP]. 
10.  Id. (quoting Pharrell Williams). 
11.  Id. 
12.  In a July 2015 post-trial decision, the District Court reduced the jury award to $5.3 
million, but granted Gaye’s family 50% of future royalties from “Blurred Lines.”  Williams v. 
Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL 4479500, at *47–48 (C.D. 
Cal. July 14, 2015). 
13.  Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke to Pay $7.4m to Marvin Gaye’s Family Over 
Blurred Lines, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
music/2015/mar/10/blurred-lines-pharrell-robin-thicke-copied-marvin-gaye.  
14.  Jon Caramanica, What’s Wrong With the ‘Blurred Lines’ Copyright Ruling, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www nytimes.com/2015/03/12/arts/music/whats-wrong-with-
the-blurred-lines-copyright-ruling html [https://perma.cc/9VS7-BNQM]. 
15.  Ben Sisario & Noah Smith, ‘Blurred Lines’ Infringed on Marvin Gaye Copyright, 
Jury Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www nytimes.com/2015/
03/11/business/media/blurred-lines-infringed-on-marvin-gaye-copyright-jury-rules html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/89T3-SQE3]. 
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characters and veracity of Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams, as 
depicted by Gaye’s attorney.”16  Williams also spoke out about the 
negative impact this judicial decision will have on the future of music 
production and creativity.17  An utmost concern is whether the decision 
stretched the boundaries of copyright protection to include the “feel” or 
“vibe” of the song—something inherently available for secondary users to 
build upon.18 
Fear that the “Blurred Lines” verdict would impede the future of 
music production and artist creativity was the basis of Williams and 
Thicke’s decision to file a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit at the end 
of 2015.19  In conjunction with the appeal, over two hundred musicians 
signed onto an amicus curiae brief in late 2016,20 detailing their collective 
 
16.  Cronin, supra note 5, at 1231. 
17.  Daniel Kreps, Pharrell Talks ‘Blurred Lines’ Lawsuit for First Time, ROLLING 
STONE (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/pharrell-talks-blurred-lines-
lawsuit-for-first-time-20150319 [https://perma.cc/7F7D-G5KB].  
The verdict handicaps any creator out there who is making something that might be 
inspired by something else.  This applies to fashion, music design . . . anything.  If we 
lose our freedom to be inspired, we’re going to look up one day and the entertainment 
industry as we know it will be frozen in litigation.  This is about protecting the 
intellectual rights of people who have ideas.  Everything that’s around you in a room 
was inspired by something or someone.  If you kill that, there’s no creativity. 
Id. (quoting Pharrell Williams); Michael Miller, Pharrell on ‘Blurred Lines’ Verdict: ‘There 
Was No Copyright Infringement’, PEOPLE (Mar. 20, 2015, 7:25 PM), 
http://www.people.com/article/pharrell-speaks-blurred-lines-no-copyright-infringement 
[https://perma.cc/QW68-ZW6K] (“If that verdict stands, people can’t be inspired by anything, 
companies can’t be inspired by anything, or else they’re liable for suit.”) (quoting Pharrell 
Williams). 
18.  Adam Pasick, A Copyright Victory for Marvin Gaye’s Family is Terrible for the 
Future of Music, QUARTZ (Mar. 10, 2015), http://qz.com/360126/a-copyright-victory-for-
marvin-gayes-family-is-terrible-for-the-future-of-music/ [https://perma.cc/CFK9-F68V]. 
When we say a song ‘sounds like’ a certain era, it’s because artists in that era were 
doing a lot of the same things—or, yes, copying each other.  If copyright were to 
extend out past things like the melody to really cover the other parts that make up the 
‘feel’ of a song, there’s no way an era, or a city, or a movement could have a certain 
sound.  Without that, we lose the next disco, the next Motown, the next batch of 
protest songs.  
Id. (quoting Parker Higgins, director of copyright activism at the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation) 
19.  Tim Kenneally & Pamela Chelin, Robin Thicke, Pharrell Williams Appeal ‘Blurred 
Lines’ Copyright Infringement Lawsuit, THE WRAP (Dec. 8, 2015, 12:59 P.M.), 
http://www.thewrap.com/robin-thicke-pharrell-williams-appeal-blurred-lines-copyright-
infringement-lawsuit/. 
20.  It is important to note that the amici curiae brief was not commissioned or paid for 
by Williams, Thicke, or anyone on their legal team, but rather was the offspring of the two 
hundred twelve musicians’ collective concerns that this verdict threatens the future of creativity, 
music production, and the music industry as a whole.  Randy Lewis, More Than 200 Musicians 
Rally Behind Appeal of ‘Blurred Lines’ Verdict, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016, 11:45 A.M.), 
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concern regarding the negative impact the verdict could have “on their 
own creativity, on the creativity of future artists, and on the music industry 
in general.”21  It further threatened that if the judgment is allowed to stand, 
it could “punish songwriters for creating new music that is inspired by 
prior works.”22  It concludes by pleading to the Ninth Circuit to overturn 
the verdict because if becomes the standard, it “would clearly stifle future 
creativity, would undoubtedly diminish the legacies of past songwriters, 
and, without a doubt, would be antithetical to the principals of the 
Copyright Act.”23 
Not all copying is actionable under copyright law.24  However, as the 
“Blurred Lines” case demonstrates, the infringement analysis utilized 
today does not always adequately account for the core characteristics of 
music, and thus has the potential to produce inaccurate findings of 
copyright infringement and meritless liability for musicians. 
This Note describes the inefficiencies of the copyright system’s test 
for infringement based on the continued use of the Ordinary Observer 
Analysis as a measure for subjective copying.  It argues that the Intended 
Audience Test should be applied in all copyright infringement cases 
involving musical works as a better subjective measure for illicit copying. 
To set the groundwork for this thesis, Part I details the background 
of copyright law, beginning with its origins in the United States 
Constitution.  Part I also discusses Congress’s numerous attempts to create 
a functioning statutory scheme that best promotes the two aims of 
copyright law—protecting the creative expression of artists, and 
benefitting society through a multitude of creative works in the public 
domain.  Finally, Part I will provide a background of specific 
characteristics of music production and consumption that are changing the 
 
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/music/la-et-ms-blurred-lines-appeal-musicians-
20160831-snap-story html. 
21.  Brief of Amici Curiae 212 Songwriters, Composers, Musicians, and Producers in 
Support of Appellants at 2, Williams v. Gaye, 2015 WL 4479500 (C.D. Cal. 2015), appeal 
docketed, No. 15-56880 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2015).  Notable artists who signed onto the brief 
include Hans Zimmer, Phillip Bailey, Verdine White, and Ralph Johnson of Earth, Wind & Fire, 
Rich Robinson of The Black Crowes, John Oates of Hall & Oates, R. Kelly, Jennifer Hudson, 
Patrick Monahan of Train, Jean Baptiste, Rivers Cuomo of Weezer, and Mat Kearney.  Id. at i–
iv. 
22.  Id. at 2. 
23.  Id. at 17.  An additional amici curiae brief was filed by musicologists detailing their 
fears that if the verdict stands, “it would curtail creativity in the field of popular music, inhibiting 
songwriters by the threat of far-fetched claims of infringement bolstered by speculative and 
misleading musical testimony.”  Amicus Curiae Brief of Musicologists in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants-Cross-Appellees at 1, Williams v. Gaye, 2015 WL 4479500 (C.D. Cal. 2015), 
appeal docketed, No. 15-56880 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2015). 
24.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
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way to evaluate these works under copyright law. 
Part II explains the current analysis for copyright infringement using 
hypothetical parties—Band X and Band Y.  It details Band X’s 
infringement claim against Band Y, and the steps Band X must go through 
under the current system.  Part II also discusses the various tests for 
substantial similarity as used within the federal circuit courts of appeal. 
The role of the Intended Audience Test within the analysis for 
substantial similarity is discussed in Part III.  Additionally, Part III 
describes the origins of the Intended Audience Test, its current 
applications, and a recent case declining to apply the test to a music 
infringement suit. 
Finally, Part IV details a three-prong argument as to why the 
Intended Audience Test will provide a more modern and effective 
subjective analysis for copyright infringement actions.  First, normalcies 
in music production are not accounted for in today’s infringement 
analysis, which creates the possibility of inaccurate infringement 
decisions.  Next, music consumption has shifted due to a new digital 
landscape, causing the “ordinary observer” to be an inadequate subjective 
measure for illicit copying.  Finally, more accurate infringement analyses 
resulting from implementation of the Intended Audience Test will better 
promote the main purpose of copyright law—to benefit the public domain. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Origins and Purpose of Copyright Law 
1. The Constitution and the Copyright Act Throughout Time 
The United States Copyright Office defines copyright law as “that 
body of exclusive rights granted by law to authors for protection of their 
work.”25  This protection is a “principle of American law” and allows “an 
author of a work [to] reap the fruits of his or her intellectual creativity for 
a limited period of time.”26  The author’s exclusive rights over the 
protected work are meant to incentivize and promote creativity through a 
national copyright system.27 
Congress’s copyright power stems from the Constitution: “[t]he 
Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”28  This 
 
25.  A Brief Introduction and History, U. S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
http://copyright.gov/circs/circ1a html [perma.cc/5XG5-XL5W]. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. 
28.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
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confers onto Congress the ability to enact a body of copyright law to 
protect the works of creators in order to promote the public welfare.29 
The Copyright Act of 1790 was Congress’s first exercise of this 
explicit power, after conflicting state copyright laws made the need for a 
national system overly evident.30  Congress modeled the Act after 
Parliament’s Statute of Anne,31 the British copyright law passed in 1710 
that granted authors full control over their works.32  However, as 
technology developed through the nineteenth century, the introduction of 
new types of works necessitated the expansion of further protections under 
the 1790 Act.33 
In 1909, a more substantial change adapted the 1790 Act to the ever-
increasing technological advances of the time.34  The 1790 Act was 
overhauled to significantly increase the scope of protection for copyright 
holders due to the new mechanisms for creating and distributing works of 
authorship—sound recordings35 being one of the most prominent.36  
However, when the 1909 Act became inefficient due to further 
technological advances, there was again interest to reform the Copyright 
Act in the mid-twentieth century.37  This time the process took over two 
decades—beginning with the Copyright Office’s report in 1955, and 
ending with the reformed Act taking effect in 1976.38 
Currently, The Copyright Act of 1976 is the basis of American 
copyright law.39  Under Section 102, copyright protection applies to 
 
29.  See A Brief Introduction and History, supra note 25.  
30.  ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 386 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007). 
31.  The Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19. 
32.  Katie M. Benton, Can Copyright Law Perform the Perfect Fouetté?: Keeping Law 
and Choreography on Balance to Achieve the Purposes of the Copyright Clause, 36 PEPP. L. 
REV. 59, 64 (2008). 
33.  MERGES ET AL., supra note 30. 
34.  Id. 
35.  It was not until 1972 that “sound recordings” of musical compositions were 
considered to be “works of authorship,” which required protection under the copyright clause.  
Ryan Lloyd, Unauthorized Digital Sampling in the Changing Music Landscape, 22 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 143, 148 (2014). 
36.  MERGES ET AL., supra note 30. 
37.  Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, 1976: Revision of 
the U.S. Copyright Act, ASS’N OF RES. LIBR., http://www.arl.org/focus-areas/copyright-
ip/2486-copyright-timeline#.Vo2JdPGEKQF [https://perma.cc/8U8M-7VPA].  
38.  MERGES ET AL., supra note 30, at 387. 
39.  The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. (90 Stat. 2541); 
see MERGES ET AL., supra note 30, at 387 (“After two decades of study, negotiation, and debate, 
Congress approved the 1976 Act, which continues to serve as the principle framework for 
copyright protection in the United States.”). 
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“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression.”40  The scope of protection extends to a variety of literary and 
artistic works because the 1976 reformation needed to account for 
technological developments at the time and their impact on copyright 
law.41  The revision also better addressed what constituted an 
infringement—laying out the idea-expression dichotomy to clearly define 
what is and is not protected under the Act.42 
2. The Rights of Copyright Holders 
Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants copyright holders exclusive 
rights to their protected work for a limited time.43  This includes the right 
to make copies and bring suit for infringement; the right to prepare 
derivative works that are in different forms or slightly altered; the right to 
control the sale and distribution of the original or derivative works; the 
right to control the public performance and display of the work; the right 
of anti-circumvention; and the moral rights to claim authorship over the 
work.44  The copyright holder does not have to obtain a registered 
copyright before exercising these exclusive rights because his expression 
is protected at the moment of creation.45 
The rights described in Section 106 are not meant to limit secondary 
use of protected material in the public domain, but rather to prevent 
unlawful infringement of the holder’s protected expression.46  Copyright 
law does not prevent independent creation of similar works, and thus a 
mechanism for determining illicit copying in violation of the copyright 
versus lawful secondary creation is necessary.47 
3. Competing Public Policy—Balancing the Purposes of Copyright 
 
40.  Despite specifying the protected works must be “tangible,” implying there must be a 
physical component to the work, the Copyright Act also protects forms of authorship normally 
considered “intangible,” such as sound recordings and audiovisual works.  17 U.S.C. § 102 
(2015). 
41.  Copyright Timeline, supra note 37.   
42.  17 U.S.C. § 102 (2015) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work 
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or 
embodied in such work.”); see also Sid & Marty Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 
562 F.2d 1157, 1163 n.6 (9th Cir. 1977) (highlighting the criticism often associated with this 
idea-expression analysis, but noting that no other viable option exists to balance the two 
competing interests of copyright law—protecting the artist and permitting society to benefit and 
progress from the use of the work). 
43.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2015). 
44.  MERGES ET AL., supra note 30, at 388–89.  
45.  Id. at 388.  
46.  Id. at 389. 
47.  Id. 
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Law 
Copyright law’s “philosophical foundations” are often debated, 
creating uncertainty as to the true purpose of copyright law.48  The “natural 
right” of authors to control the use of their works has been a predominate 
factor in determining the scope of copyright protection.49  However, there 
is a utilitarian function of copyright law that competes against the 
monopoly interest of copyright holders—the necessity to enrich the public 
domain50 with creative, artistic, and literary works.51 
Copyright law must balance these two competing interests to best 
promote the “harvest of knowledge” for society as a whole.52  There are 
numerous societal benefits that stem from a constant production of 
creative works in the public domain.53  This includes the vast influx of 
new knowledge for follow-up creators to use and build upon, the 
educational value of creative material on society’s knowledge and culture, 
and consumptive and economic uses of artistic works to increase the 
cultural landscape.54 
With these societal benefits in mind, note that the “exclusive rights” 
associated with copyright protection have been known to create a quasi-
monopoly for artists over their protected work.55  The exaggerated length 
and scope of copyright protection can actually work to hinder the benefit 
to the public domain.56  Despite arguments that the monopoly privileges 
 
48.  Id. at 390. 
49.  Id. 
50.  Séverine Dusollier, Scoping Study on Copyright and Related Rights and the Public 
Domain, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 6 (May 7, 2010), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip_4_3_rev_study_inf_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RVS4-FTG8] (“The public domain is generally defined as encompassing 
intellectual elements that are not protected by copyright or whose protection has lapsed, due to 
the expiration of the duration for protection.”). 
51.  MERGES ET AL., supra note 30, at 390–91. 
52.  Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Towards a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1105, 1107 (1990). 
53.  Dusollier, supra note 50, at 13.   
54.  Id. at 14. 
55.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (“The 
monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the 
public.”); see also Leval, supra note 52, at 1109. 
The copyright law embodies a recognition that creative intellectual activity is vital to 
the well-being of society.  It is a pragmatic measure by which society confers 
monopoly-exploitation benefits for a limited duration on authors and artists . . . in 
order to obtain for itself the intellectual and practical enrichment that results from 
creative endeavors. 
Id. 
56.  William Patry, Time to Update Copyright Law?, CNN (Jan. 31, 2012, 4:30 PM), 
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of copyright holders are counter-balanced against “numerous and 
substantial exceptions and limitations to protection,” the copyright system 
is primarily a mechanism for fostering creativity and enriching the public 
with a multitude of artistic expression.57  The scope of protection for 
holders must be restricted by exceptions and limitations in order to 
promote that purpose.58 
This monopolistic system was never the intention, nor the purpose, 
of copyright law.59  The privileges granted from copyright protection are 
not meant to be all-encompassing or overly restrictive on secondary users, 
but rather are to “motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors 
by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the 
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has 
expired.”60  However, Congress is tasked with defining the scope of 
protection for copyright holders, while also aiming to promote a multitude 
of artistic expression for the public, and thus, striking the perfect balance 
has not been easy.61 
Evidence exists that copyright protection was always intended to be 
limited—beginning with the origins of copyright law.62  The time 
restriction noted in the text of the Constitution confirms that the protection 
 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/31/opinion/patry-copyright-law/ [https://perma.cc/FBP2-KNZX] 
(arguing the 1909 Act had a more sensible term of protection—28 years with the possibility of 
an additional 28 years if the copyright holder filed a renewal—so that artists were still very 
much protected, but consumers were better able to benefit from the works).  
57.  MERGES ET AL., supra note 30, at 388; Karen Bevill, Copyright Infringement and 
Access: Has the Access Requirement Lost its Probative Value?, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 311, 313 
(1999) (“As a society, we value the arts and wish to foster creativity through the granting and 
enforcement of copyrights”). 
58.  Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429 (“The monopoly privileges that Congress may 
authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit.  
Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved.”).  
59.  H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909). 
The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection accorded to music 
has been to give the composer an adequate return for the value of his composition, 
and it has been a serious and a difficult task to combine the protection of the composer 
with the protection of the public, and to so frame an act that it would accomplish the 
double purpose of securing to the composer an adequate return for all use made of his 
composition and at the same time prevent the formation of oppressive monopolies, 
which might be founded upon the very rights granted to the composer for the purpose 
of protecting his interests. 
Id. 
60.  Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429. 
61.  Id. (suggesting Congress’s difficult task of balancing the two competing interest is 
one reason why the Copyright Act has been amended previously). 
62.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Congress can grant to copyright holders is not absolute.63  In drafting the 
copyright clause, the Framers of the Constitution “balance[d] the 
competing interests of incentivizing creation and ensuring freedom to 
information by limiting the term of copyright.”64  It was the intention of 
the Framers to make this protection penetrable for the good of the public.65 
Legislators attempted to further limit copyright holders’ exclusive 
rights to their protected work to better balance the two competing 
interests.66  In addition to the limited time of copyright protection, which 
is the life of the artist plus seventy years,67 copyright law limits owners’ 
protection through means such as the fair use, first sale, merger doctrines, 
and compulsory licensing.68  These modifications to copyright law shift 
the monopoly of artists, and demonstrate Congress’s attempts to promote 
the goal of enriching the public domain with creative works.69 
Regardless of the two competing interests at stake—the artists’ 
protection versus enrichment of the public domain—copyright 
jurisprudence indicates protection for the artists is always secondary.70  
The protection that copyright law grants is not meant to be an 
impenetrable shield for the creator, but rather a mechanism of 
incentivizing the production of creative works in order to “stimulate 
activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the 
public.”71  This is what copyright law was intended to do—this is its 
 
63.  Id. (referring to the copyright protection as extending only “for limited times”); see 
also Leval, supra note 52, at 1108 (“[T]he right may be conferred only ‘for limited times’ 
confirms that it was not seen as an absolute or moral right, inherent in natural law”). 
64.  Lloyd, supra note 35, at 149. 
65.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (“The utility of this power will scarcely 
be questioned . . . .  The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of 
individuals.”). 
66.  Lloyd, supra note 35, at 149. 
67.  17 U.S.C. § 302 (2015) (applying only to works created on or after January 1, 1978). 
68.  Lloyd, supra note 35, at 149; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–22 (2015). 
69.  Lloyd, supra note 35, at 149; see also MERGES ET AL., supra note 30, at 387 (“[T]he 
1976 Act weakened intellectual property protection by establishing several new compulsory 
licensing regimes, approving numerous exceptions from liability, codifying the fair use doctrine 
that had been developing through the courts, and preempting most state and common law 
protections that impinge upon federal copyright protection.”). 
70.  United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The copyright 
law . . . makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.”); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 
U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in 
conferring the monopoly [to copyright holders] lie in the general benefits derived by the public 
from the labors of authors.”). 
71.  Leval, supra note 52 (“The copyright is not an inevitable, divine, or natural right that 
confers on authors the absolute ownership of their creations.”). 
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primary goal.72 
B. Music and the Law 
The interaction of music and law is uniquely distinct to copyright 
litigation—“[w]hile the first is commonly regarded as a rule-free zone, the 
second is in itself the origin for rules.”73  Historically, courts have applied 
copyright law to music just like any other work of authorship.74  With the 
introduction of music copyright law in the early 1800s, courts included it 
with other works of authorship because the role of music in everyday life 
at that time was much less complex and required less differentiation.75  
However, as music developed and started to hold a “prominent stature in 
society,” music copyright law remained comparatively stagnant.76 
Music has a deep effect on individuals, “speak[ing] to us in 
mysterious and profound ways and invok[ing] within us numerous 
physiological and emotional responses.”77  When listening to music, 
nearly every region of the brain is actively working, making it a highly 
technical neurological process.78  It takes multiple neural regions to break 
down and comprehend the various musical elements of a song, such as 
tempo, pitch, and timbre.79  Even deeper, because of its communicative 
power, the emotional responses evoked from music make it distinctive 
from other forms of artistic expression.80 
Although there is limited understanding as to why humans are 
affected so deeply by music, there is no doubt it is crucial to human nature 
and the way we lead our daily lives.81  Conforming music to fit in the 
narrowly tailored box that is copyright law does not adequately measure 
 
72.  See Arden v. Columbia Pictures, Indus., 908 F. Supp. 1248, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(stating that the main goal of fostering creativity is a core consideration in determinations 
regarding substantial similarity); see also Pendleton v. Acuff-Rose Publ’ns, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 
477, 484 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (arguing that fostering creativity and allowing the public to benefit 
from creative works is a fundamental objective of copyright law).  
73.  Iyar Stav, Musical Plagiarism: A True Challenge for the Copyright Law, 25 DEPAUL 
J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 2 (2014). 
74.  J. Michael Keyes, Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music Copyright 
Protection, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 407, 410 (2004). 
75.  Id. at 419. 
76.  Id. 
77.  Id. at 421. 
78.  DANIEL J. LEVITIN, THIS IS YOUR BRAIN ON MUSIC: THE SCIENCE OF A HUMAN 
OBSESSION 84 (Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 2007). 
79.  Id. 
80.  Keyes, supra note 74, at 422–23 (“It inspires, consoles, motivates, awakens, and 
energizes us unlike other artistic endeavors.  It can make us weep or give us intense pleasure.”) 
(internal quotations omitted).  
81.  Id. at 423. 
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how music is perceived and comprehended by society, nor does it promote 
copyright law’s broader policy goals.82  The law needs to be “tailored to 
provide greater flexibility in the manner in which people are allowed to 
respond to music that they perceive.”83  Therefore, necessary changes to 
music copyright law are crucial to differentiate it from other forms of 
authorship.84 
C. Characteristics of Music Production 
Elements of music production distinguish it from all other forms of 
authorship.85  For example, borrowing and copying music between artists 
is a common practice—“[f]or the most part, taking someone else’s 
musical idea and developing it in a new way is largely understood as part 
of musical culture and thus entirely consistent with cultural norms.”86  
From the days of classical composers studying similar concepts, to the 
new era of sampling and digital manipulation that transforms past musical 
creations, copying has always been at the root of music production.87  
Even the two hundred twelve songwriters, composers, producers, and 
musicians who backed the amici curiae brief in favor of overturning the 
“Blurred Lines” verdict, recognize that “[a]ll music shares inspiration 
from prior musical works, especially within a particular musical genre.”88  
This endorsement by the industry’s top talent supports the conclusion that 
borrowing and copying as a part of music production, is not only 
theoretically accurate, but the practical applications of these 
characteristics are also widely recognized and utilized within the music 
industry.89 
The artists’ collective sentiment in their brief to the Ninth Circuit is 
that “[v]irtually no music can be said to be 100% new and original.”90  As 
evidence to support this notion, the brief cites a string of famous musical 
inspirations, noting how each inspiration shaped the production of 
legendary music that came after it—specifically, it notes how Elton John 
was influenced by The Beatles, who were influenced by Elvis Presley, 
 
82.  Id. 
83.  Id. 
84.  Id. 
85.  See Carys Craig & Guillaume Laroche, Out of Tune: Why Copyright Law Needs 
Music Lessons, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: INTERDISCIPLINARY 
APPROACHES 43, 47 (B.C. Doagoo et al. eds., 2014). 
86.  Id. 
87.  Id. at 48. 
88.  Brief of Amici Curiae 212 Songwriters, Composers, Musicians, and Producers, supra 
note 21. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. at 9. 
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who was inspired by pop, country, gospel, and R&B music he listened to 
as a teenager growing up in Memphis.91  The brief goes on to question 
whether music legends, including Marvin Gaye, would have been able to 
cultivate such powerful and memorable music if they had been afraid to 
draw inspiration from past idols.92 
For music creation to continue to expand and prosper, adaptation of 
past musical works through copying and borrowing is necessary.93  This 
is because there are only a limited number of musical note combinations 
that are pleasing to the Western listener, making the possible combination 
of notes for new musical works highly limited.94  Characteristics of a 
particular genre will also control compositional choices and dictate 
tonalities of musical works.95 
Judge Learned Hand even recognized these limitations in 1940 by 
writing: “It must be remembered that while there are an enormous number 
of possible permutations of the musical notes of the scale, only a few are 
pleasing; and much fewer still suit the infantile demands of the popular 
ear.  Recurrence is not therefore an inevitable badge of plagiarism.”96  
These constraints greatly impact music production and limit the range of 
expression available to musicians—making the artist’s ability to produce 
music free from any past expression close to impossible.97  Rather than 
viewing adaptation of past musical works as illicit copying, artists 
recognize that their works will be used as building blocks for future 
creators to produce their own music—a fact currently ignored by 
copyright law.98 
 
91.  Id.  
92.  Id. at 9–10 (“Quite simply, if an artist is not allowed to display his or her musical 
influences, for fear of legal reprisal, there is very little new music that is going to be created, 
particularly with the limitations that already naturally exist in songwriting.”).  
93.  Craig & Laroche, supra note 85, at 48.  
94.  Margit Livingston & Joseph Urbinato, Copyright Infringement of Music: 
Determining Whether What Sounds Alike Is Alike, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 227, 262 
(2013).  
95.  Id. 
96.  Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80 (2d. Cir. 1940) 
97.  Livingston & Urbinato, supra note 94, at 263. 
98.  Brief of Amici Curiae 212 Songwriters, Composers, Musicians, and Producers, supra 
note 21, at 13.  
All musical works, indeed all creative works, are born from a spark of inspiration.  It 
is essential for musicians and composers to be able to find this spark anywhere and 
everywhere without having to constantly look over their shoulders and worry about 
being sued.  To extinguish this spark, to replace it with fear, is to stifle creativity and 
deprive society of the next generation of great artists and new music.  And yes, artists 
should be able to talk freely about their sources of inspiration without having to worry 
about their exuberant proclamations being played back as damning evidence in a court 
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D. Music Consumption Over Time 
Music continues to be a constant pulse in society.99  However, the 
way individuals consume music is changing dramatically.100  The increase 
in streaming technology created a shift from traditional mediums, like 
radio and hard-copy CDs, to a more online-driven music experience.101  
Currently, an astounding seventy-five percent of the U.S. population 
listens to music online.102 
On-demand and curated streaming services, such as Pandora, 
Spotify, and YouTube, are now an integral part of how the everyday 
American obtains and consumes music.103  A Nielsen104 study of media 
consumption during 2014 showed a fifty-four percent increase in on-
demand streaming, and over 164 billion songs streamed through audio and 
video platforms.105  Another Nielsen study showed a total of over 135 
billion songs streamed in the first half of 2015 alone—indicating this trend 
is growing, and fast.106 
Music consumption is not only shifting to a primarily online format, 
it is also going mobile—the study reported forty-four percent of 
participants use smartphones to listen to music each week rather than 
home computers.107  Expenditures on music have also largely shifted to 
online streaming services because of the relatively low cost of obtaining 
 
of law. 
Id. at 15 (quoting Ron Mendelsohn, owner of production company Megatrax). 
99.  Nielsen Music 360 Report: 2015 Highlights, NIELSEN 6 (2015), 
http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reports-downloads/2015-reports/music-
360-2015-highlights-sept-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ADW3-547N]. 
100.  See id. 
101.  See Armen Boyajian, The Sound of Money: Securing Copyright, Royalties, and 
Creative “Progress” in the Digital Music Revolution, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 587, 589 (2010) 
(“Compared to the costly production and distribution methods that characterized the age of 
tangible media (e.g., LPs, analog tapes, CDs, and DVDs), the advent of digitally compressed 
audio formats and online networks has opened superior channels for the proliferation of 
music.”). 
102.  Nielsen Music 360 Report: 2015 Highlights, supra note 99.  
103.  See Jacob Ganz, How Streaming Is Changing Music, NPR MUSIC (June 1, 2015, 
10:20 AM), http://www npr.org/sections/therecord/2015/06/01/411119372/how-streaming-is-
changing-music [https://perma.cc/4J4N-2TQX].  
104.  About Us, NIELSEN, http://www nielsen.com/us/en/about-us html [https://
perma.cc/P98N-59MB] (providing in-depth studies of media consumption throughout the world 
to help businesses get a complete view of trends and habits of consumers). 
105.  2014 Nielsen Music Report, NIELSEN (Jan. 7, 2015), http://
www nielsen.com/us/en/press-room/2015/2014-nielsen-music-report html 
[https://perma.cc/KE4Q-8EST]. 
106.  Nielsen Music 360 Report: 2015 Highlights, supra note 99, at 3. 
107.  Id. 
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these services, their user-friendly nature, and the expansive song library 
available.108 
Although this emerging digital marketplace allows a broader 
spectrum of music to reach consumers, the increased usage of on-demand 
and curated streaming services, at home or on the go, has shifted daily 
music consumption to a more personalized format.109  This is due to the 
design of on-demand streaming platforms, which is geared towards 
promoting individualized consumption of music.110 
For example, to create the most personalized listening experience, 
Spotify utilizes music intelligence that generates “the right listening 
experience at the right time.”111  This is done through a comprehensive 
system of analyzing the makeup of songs, discovering what is being said 
about music online, and researching how people are listening to it.112  
After tracking each user’s listening habits, individual “taste profiles” are 
created to produce the most individualized listening experience.113  The 
taste profiles break down into “taste clusters” that often highlight the 
user’s favorite genre of music versus what they are listening to as 
background music while focused on something else.114  Taste clusters 
allow Spotify to promote the most accurate scope of songs, artists, and 
playlists to fit the unique taste of the listener.115  Spotify also offers its 
“Discover Weekly” playlist, based off each user’s taste profile, to 
highlight new music in the specific genre in which the user is interested.116  
 
108.  Id. at 5–6. 
109.  See Marc Hogan, How Playlists Are Curating the Future of Music, PITCHFORK (July 
16, 2015), http://pitchfork.com/features/articles/9686-up-next-how-playlists-are-curating-the-
future-of-music/ [https://perma.cc/K9T6-AHHE] (detailing the lengths on-demand streaming 
services are going through to differentiate themselves by helping users customize their playlists 
and other listening patterns). 
110.  Alex Heath, Spotify is Getting Unbelievably Good at Picking Music—Here’s an 
Inside Look at How, TECH INSIDER (Sept. 3, 2015, 9:23 AM), http://www.techinsider.io/inside-
spotify-and-the-future-of-music-streaming [https://perma.cc/8QPA-QNLR] (claiming that it is 
Spotify’s mission to make the most personalized music listening service ever); see also John 
Seabrook, Revenue Streams: Is Spotify the Music Industry’s Friend or its Foe?, NEW YORKER 
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://www newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/revenue-streams 
[https://perma.cc/9YGH-FUN4]. 
111.  Heath, supra note 110 (quoting Jim Lucchese, CEO of The Echo Nest, Spotify’s 
music intelligence company). 
112.  Id. 
113.  Id. 
114.  Id. (describing the background music as the user’s “lean back” listening 
experience). 
115.  Id. 
116.  Id. (“[Matt] Ogle gives a simple analogy for how Discover Weekly works: You’ve 
been playing song A and song C a lot, but it turns out that when other people play those songs 
together in their playlists there’s a song B that you’ve never heard before.  Discover Weekly 
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Through the use of the customized playlists, these on-demand streaming 
platforms provide music suggestions to users in the exact style they enjoy 
without having to search for it.117 
Streaming services grow in popularity daily, and consumers shift to 
sites like Spotify in record numbers because of their customizable 
services.118  The unique features of streaming services, specifically the 
ability to customize the listening experience, make them a great fit in 
today’s musical landscape.119  Instead of forcing listeners to sort through 
every music genre, streaming services allow today’s listener to 
personalize their music choices.120 
II. THE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS & THE VARIOUS 
MEASURES OF SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY 
When a party feels his copyrighted work has been copied, he can file 
an infringement claim against the alleged infringer in federal court.121  
However, a copyright infringement claim is deceivingly complex, as it 
involves many steps for a claimant to succeed once at trial.122  To ensure 
the most accurate depiction of how an infringement suit operates under 
current copyright law, this section of the Note presents hypothetical 
parties to an infringement claim—Band X wants to bring a claim against 
Band Y for infringing on their copyrighted work under Section 501 of the 
 
gives you song B.”). 
117.  Id. (“I see Discover Weekly as one of the first products from this new era of 
personalization, but ultimately we’d love for everything you interact with on Spotify to feel like 
there’s a bit of you in it.”) (quoting Matt Ogle, Spotify employee in charge of Discover Weekly 
playlist). 
118.  Spotify has doubled its paid subscribers to 20 million in the last year, and has an 
additional 55 million free users accessing its music library of over 35 million songs.  Id. 
119.  Jareen Imam, Young Listeners Opting to Stream, Not Own Music, CNN (June 16, 
2012, 3:39 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/15/tech/web/music-streaming/ 
[https://perma.cc/67HX-TYWL]. 
120.  Id. 
121.  17 U.S.C. § 501 (2015).  
122.  Jason E. Sloan, An Overview of the Elements of Copyright Infringement Cause of 
Action – Part I: Introduction and Copying, A.B.A. YOUNG LAWS. DIV., 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_serie
s/elements_of_a_copyright html [https://perma.cc/N4CC-3D38].  
[The infringement analysis] does not lend itself to helpful generalizations because the 
test for infringement is necessarily vague.  This allows for the test to be applied to 
various types of works and contexts regardless of the nature of the copying.  To further 
complicate copyright infringement actions, different courts have applied the elements 
of infringement in somewhat conflicting ways, resulting in the creation of exceptions 
and carve-outs based on the particular facts at hand. 
Id. 
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Copyright Act.123  To do this, Band X must first establish a valid copyright 
on its work, and then prove that Band Y unlawfully copied protectable 
elements of that work.124 
A registered copyright, granted under Section 410 of the Copyright 
Act, provides prima facie proof of a valid copyright.125  If Band X has a 
copyright certificate, Band Y may rebut its validity by taking on the 
burden of proving the falsity of an improperly granted certificate.126 
Once a valid copyright has been established, the burden shifts to 
Band X, the copyright holder, to prove copying of protectable material.127  
At this stage in the analysis, simply identifying commonalities between 
the two works is not sufficient proof.128  Therefore, to effectively prove 
infringement of copyrighted material, Band X must prove: (1) actual 
copying, and (2) that a substantial amount of copying occurred, which 
warrants a finding of unlawful appropriation of its protectable 
expression.129 
A. Step One: Actual Copying 
Actual copying is often difficult to prove because obtaining direct 
evidence of copying—through Band Y’s own admission, witness 
testimony, or a record of Band Y’s physical copying—is rare.130  
Therefore, most infringement actions instead utilize the inference of actual 
copying.131  To prove actual copying through inference, Band X must 
prove Band Y had access to the work and that probative similarity exists 
between the works.132 
1. Access 
The element of access requires Band X to prove the reasonable 
possibility that the accused work was available to Band Y, the alleged 
infringer.133  Reasonable possibility of access may be proven from 
 
123.  17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2015) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author.”). 
124.  Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
125.  17 U.S.C. § 410 (2015).  
126.  Bevill, supra note 57, at 316. 
127.  Irina D. Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303, 1331 (2012). 
128.  See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
129.  Id. 
130.  Timothy L. Warnock, “Access” and “Striking Similarity” in Copyright 
Infringement Litigation, 3 LANDSLIDE 18, 18 (2010).  
131.  Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484, 488 (4th Cir. 2015).  
132.  Id. 
133.  Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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widespread dissemination of Band X’s work134 or from a proven link 
between Band X’s work and Band Y.135  However, if the two works are so 
“strikingly similar” that it makes Band Y’s independent creation is 
unreasonable, then access may be inferred.136 
2. Probative Similarity 
In determining the probative similarity137 between Band X’s 
copyrighted work and Band Y’s alleged copy, courts consider unoriginal 
or non-protectable elements of the work.138  At this stage, the court 
assesses whether there are enough elements of copying to go forward with 
the infringement claim.139  This inquiry is necessary to prove that factual 
copying occurred, and to negate claims that Band Y independently created 
the alleged infringing work, free from the use of Band X’s protected 
expression.140 
Band Y may rebut any of the circumstantial evidence associated with 
actual copying.141  Band Y can provide evidence that its work was, in fact, 
independently created, or evidence that shows that there is no reasonable 
possibility of access to Band X’s work to negate claims of actual 
copying.142 
B. Step Two: Unlawful Appropriation 
As actual copying can be insufficient to prevail on an actionable 
infringement claim, Band X must next establish unlawful appropriation to 
succeed in an infringement action.143  The test for unlawful appropriation 
requires Band X to prove that Band Y’s infringing work is substantially 
 
134.  ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998 (2d Cir. 1983); 
see 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.02[A] (explaining that a 
copyrighted work becomes widely disseminated by extensive publication or through modern 
technology, such as the Internet, which can make almost any work accessible to the larger 
public).  
135.  De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 410 (2d Cir. 1944).  
136.  Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984). 
137.  In copyright literature, probative similarity is often referred to as “substantial 
similarity” by courts in proving actual copying.  Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” As Proof 
of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
1187, 1189–90 (1990).  However, “substantial similarity” is relevant in proving unlawful 
appropriation of Band X’s copyrightable expression, after actual copying has been inferred.  Id. 
138.  Sloan, supra note 122. 
139.  Id. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984). 
143.  DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (N.D. Tex. 
1995), aff’d, 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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similar to their protected material.144  At this stage, the determination 
regarding “substantial similarity” is made.145 
Copyright protection only extends to the artist’s expression, not facts 
or ideas, and this separation plays a large role in the ultimate determination 
of substantial similarity.146  This idea-expression dichotomy acts as the 
dividing line between protected material under copyright law and 
unprotected material that should remain in the public domain for future 
use.147  The distinction between protectable and non-protectable material 
speaks to the balancing of the two policy considerations of copyright 
law—protecting the creators and benefitting the public.148  The idea-
expression dichotomy shapes the court’s ultimate determination of 
substantial similarity.149  In this process, courts aim to find substantial 
similarity between the works only in their expression—if they share mere 
ideas, there is no infringement.150 
The courts currently utilize a variety of tests to measure whether 
there is substantial similarity in copyright infringement cases.151  The 
application of these tests, and the language used to describe the process, 
is quite complicated, as courts often attempt to re-work the tests to clarify 
misunderstandings.152  However, these alterations often lead to more 
uncertainty as to what it actually means for works to be “substantially 
similar,” and leave no foundation for any standardized test.153  This is one 
reason there is currently a split in the circuit courts regarding the proper 
 
144.  Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 1992). 
145.  DSC Commc’ns Corp., 898 F. Supp. at 1188 (“Not all copying is copyright 
infringement.  The second question that must be analyzed is whether the copying at issue is 
legally actionable.  This question involves a comparative analysis of the two works at issue to 
determine whether they are substantially similar.”). 
146.  17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2015). 
147.  Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, Do We Even Need a Test? A Reevaluation of Assessing 
Substantial Similarity in a Copyright Infringement Case, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1375, 1381 (2007). 
148.  See supra Section I.A.3. 
149.  Roodhuyzen, supra note 147, at 1382. 
150.  There are issues regarding the accuracy of the court’s evaluation between what 
constitutes expression versus an idea.  Id.  There is currently no bright line rule to make this 
determination, and courts are often left to their own devices in making these conclusions.  Id.  
However, this issue is not within the scope of this Note, and will not be addressed outside of 
acknowledging that the court must make this distinction in determining substantial similarity.  
151.  See discussion infra Sections II.B.1–3.  
152.  Roodhuyzen, supra note 147, at 1382. 
153.  Ambiguity in the realm of substantial similarity tests results in unpredictable results 
and ad hoc judicial decision-making.  Id.  This raises the question of whether the Supreme Court 
should formulate one single test, or if there should even be a test at all.  Id.  However, arguments 
regarding whether the existence of a test in is the best interest of the copyright system is outside 
the scope of this Note. 
2017] ADOPTING THE INTENDED AUDIENCE TEST 21 
way to test for substantial similarity.154 
The following sections briefly discuss the different tests used in the 
circuit courts as a means for analyzing substantial similarity.  The majority 
of circuits follow the traditional Ordinary Observer Analysis,155 others 
utilize the Extrinsic/Intrinsic Analysis,156 and some follow a version of the 
Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Analysis.157  Although the specifics of 
the tests vary, there is a constant in each—the subjective determination for 
unlawful appropriation.158  The Intended Audience Test should replace the 
subjective determination for unlawful appropriation in all current 
infringement analyses involving musical works. 
1. The Ordinary Observer Analysis 
The landmark case Arnstein v. Porter developed the framework for 
copyright infringement.159  Although criticized as highly plaintiff-
friendly160 and oftentimes overbroad in its subjective analysis,161 the 
structure set up in Arnstein remains the basis for all substantial similarity 
tests applied today.162 
In the Arnstein decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals created 
a two-step infringement test requiring: (1) evidence of access and 
probative similarity, and (2) a finding of illicit copying amounting to 
unlawful appropriation.163  The second step in the analysis uses the 
 
154.  Id. 
155.  Peel & Co., Inc. v. Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 2001); Dawson v. Hinshaw 
Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir. 1990); Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, 
Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608 (1st Cir. 1988); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 
672 F.2d 607, 614–15 (7th Cir. 1982); Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 
907 (3d Cir. 1975); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 
1960). 
156.  Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1987); Sid & Marty 
Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).  
157.  Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 855 (6th Cir. 2003); Sturdza v. United Arab 
Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 
Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993). 
158.  Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(detailing the subjective component of the abstraction-filtration-comparison analysis); Sid & 
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1164 (detailing the subjective component of 
the extrinsic/intrinsic analysis); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (detailing 
the subjective component of the “ordinary observer” analysis). 
159.  Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 464. 
160.  Cronin, supra note 5, at 1193. 
161.  See Roodhuyzen, supra note 147, at 1390–91.   
162.  Aaron M. Broaddus, Eliminating the Confusion: A Restatement of the Test for 
Copyright Infringement, 5 DEPAUL-LAC J. ART & ENT. L. 43, 46 (1995). 
163.  Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
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perspective of the “ordinary lay hearer.”164  The assumption that the 
“ordinary observer” is the proper subjective measure stems from the 
Court’s finding that copyright law is meant to protect the artist from lost 
financial returns resulting from infringing work.165  The Court reasoned 
since the “ordinary observer” is part of the audience that interacts with the 
work in the marketplace, it is he who should determine whether the 
copying amounts to unlawful appropriation, and thus infringement 
liability.166 
Despite its longevity and prominence in copyright history, many 
critics have highlighted the ineffectiveness of the Arnstein analysis.167  
Even the dissenting opinion gravely critiqued the majority’s finding that 
the “ordinary observer” is the best measure of subjective similarity.168  
These criticisms, as well as judicial decisions deviating from the original 
Arnstein procedure, exemplify the downfalls of the Ordinary Observer 
Analysis. 
2. The Extrinsic/Intrinsic Analysis 
One of the first recognized variations of the Arnstein decision was 
the development of the Extrinsic/Intrinsic Analysis in Sid & Marty Krofft 
Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corporation.169  In this case, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reformulated the two-part test 
established in Arnstein based on the idea-expression dichotomy of 
copyright law.170  The extrinsic prong is an objective determination for 
 
164.  Id.  To constitute unlawful appropriation, the Court must determine “whether 
defendant took from plaintiff’s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of the lay listeners, 
who compromise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant 
wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.”  Id. at 473. 
165.  Id. 
166.  Id. 
167.  Paul M. Grinvalsky, Idea-Expression in Musical Analysis and the Role of the 
Intended Audience in Music Copyright Infringement, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 397 (1992) (“The 
result [of the ordinary observer analysis] is a finding of infringement where perhaps none exists, 
chilling the creation of new musical works.  Or, equally as unfortunate, a finding of no 
infringement where unlawful copying has actually occurred.”). 
168.  Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 475–76 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
Of course, sound is important in a case of this kind, but it is not so important as to 
falsify what the eye reports and the mind teaches.  Otherwise plagiarism would be 
suggested by the mere drumming of repetitious sound from our usual popular 
music . . . particularly when ears may be dulled by long usage, possibly artistic 
repugnance or boredom, or mere distance which causes all sounds to merge. 
Id. 
169.  562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).  
170.  Id. at 1164. 
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probative similarity171 between the works’ “criteria which can be listed 
and analyzed.”172  This process allows the use of expert testimony and 
analytic dissection173 to aid the trier of fact.174  The intrinsic prong utilizes 
the “ordinary observer” standard from Arnstein to make a subjective 
evaluation regarding unlawful appropriation.175  There is a finding of 
intrinsic similarity if “the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect 
disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic 
appeal as the same.”176  At this stage, expert testimony and analytic 
dissection is not considered.177 
As with the Ordinary Observer Analysis, this test is criticized as 
well.178  Inclusion of expert testimony and analytic dissection in the 
extrinsic prong, but exclusion during the intrinsic prong, presents 
challenges for the fact finder, who might be the decision-maker during the 
entire infringement analysis.179  Shifting from the extrinsic prong to the 
intrinsic prong, but asking the fact finder to ignore the information utilized 
in making an extrinsic determination, is close to impossible.180  This raises 
doubts as to accuracy of the test’s subjective determination, and due to 
these inefficiencies, the test does not apply easily to complex, technical 
subject matter, such as in music cases.181 
3. The Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Analysis 
A minority of courts apply the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison 
 
171.  The Krofft opinion described the extrinsic analysis as a determination of “substantial 
similarity in ideas” because of its foundation in the idea-expression dichotomy.  Id.  However, 
this language is misleading and confusing, since a finding of probative similarity does not only 
focus on non-protectable material (ideas), but rather on similarities in the entirety of the work.  
Broaddus, supra note 162, at 51 nn.44–47.  Later decisions in the Ninth Circuit have modified 
the Krofft analysis to avoid these problems.  Id. 
172.  Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1164. 
173.  Analytic dissection “involves breaking works down into their constituent elements 
and comparing those elements to determine whether the similarities that exist are in the 
unprotectable elements (for example ideas or scenes a faire).”  Roodhuyzen, supra note 147, at 
1399. 
174.  Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1164. 
175.  Id. (“The two works involved in this appeal should be considered and tested, not 
hypercritically or with meticulous scrutiny, but by the observations and impressions of the 
average reasonable reader and spectator.”) (quoting Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. 
Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1944)). 
176.  Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d. Cir. 1960). 
177.  Livingston & Urbinato, supra note 94, at 261. 
178.  Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al., Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 269 
(2014). 
179.  Id.  
180.  Id. 
181.  Roodhuyzen, supra note 147, at 1402. 
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Analysis for substantial similarity.182  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
outlined the three-step test as follows: 
At the abstraction step, we separate the ideas (and basic utilitarian 
functions), which are not protectable, from the particular expression 
of the work.  Then, we filter out of the nonprotectable components of 
the product from the original expression.  Finally, we compare the 
remaining protected elements to the allegedly copied work to 
determine if the two works are substantially similar.183 
The “ordinary observer” methodology is applied during the 
comparison step of this process, but considers only protectable elements 
of the copyrighted work, rather than the works in their entirety.184  Since 
the goal of the analysis is to filter out the protectable expression from the 
non-protectable ideas, this test is also criticized as being vague and 
difficult to apply, as there has been no clear direction or procedure on how 
the filtration occurs.185 
III. THE INTENDED AUDIENCE TEST: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE 
ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS THAT DEVIATE  
FROM THE “ORDINARY OBSERVER” 
A constant throughout the numerous tests for substantial similarity is 
the subjective component—would the “ordinary, lay listener” find illicit 
copying.186  In situations where the works at issue are more technical and 
require greater skill, a minority of courts adopted a variation from the 
default “ordinary” recipient of the copyrighted material.187  This is the 
Intended Audience Test. 
A. A Change to Arnstein 
One of the first alterations to Arnstein’s Ordinary Observer Analysis 
was in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.188  In 
this case, competing computer programs involved subject matter so 
complicated (for its time) that an ordinary lay jury or judge would have 
 
182.  Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 1996). 
183.  Id. at 1284–85 (emphasis added). 
184.  Id. at 1288. 
185.  Roodhuyzen, supra note 147, at 1408 (“[T]his test does not provide much guidance 
on how to [filter out the non-protectable elements] and offers little direction to answer the 
ultimate question of whether a work has been improperly appropriated.”). 
186.  Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (detailing the subjective 
component of the “ordinary observer” analysis); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. 
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (detailing the subjective component of 
the extrinsic/intrinsic analysis); Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc., 77 F.3d at 1288 (detailing the 
subjective component of the abstraction-filtration-comparison analysis). 
187.  Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990). 
188.  797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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found it impossible to make determinations regarding substantial 
similarity.189  The court did not apply Arnstein’s bifurcated analysis, 
where a finding of probative similarity is followed by the substantial 
similarity analysis.190  Rather, it made one determination regarding 
substantial similarity utilizing the expert testimony, and combined it with 
the opinions of the lay listener.191  The court found it necessary to consider 
a narrower audience in its application of the substantial similarity test 
because the scope of the original work was beyond the comprehension of 
the general public.192 
With the shift in software cases utilizing a more focused audience as 
the measure for the subjective component of the substantial similarity test, 
one question was left unanswered—whether this analysis would extend to 
other works of authorship, particularly music.193  Dawson v. Hinshaw 
Music, Inc. was the first extension of the Intended Audience Test to music 
copyright law.194 
This case involved an interpretation of the spiritual song “Ezekiel 
Saw de Wheel” by the international composer William Levi Dawson.195  
Although the words and melody of the song were considered to be in the 
public domain, Dawson obtained a registered copyright of his particular 
arrangement.196  Forty years later, a secondary composer made an 
arrangement of the song, and granted Hinshaw Music exclusive rights to 
 
189.  Philip C. Baxa & M. William Krasilovsky, Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc.: The 
Fourth Circuit Revisits Arnstein and the “Intended Audience” Test, 1 FORDHAM ENT. MEDIA 
& INTELL. PROP. L.F. 91, 94–95 (1991).  
190.  Whelan Associates, Inc., 797 F.2d at 1232. 
191.  Id. 
[T]he distinction between the two parts of the Arnstein test may be of doubtful value 
when the finder of fact is the same person for each step: that person has been exposed 
to expert evidence in the first step, yet she or he is supposed to ignore or ‘forget’ that 
evidence in analyzing the problem under the second step.  Especially in complex 
cases, we doubt that ‘forgetting’ can be effective when the expert testimony is 
essential to even the most fundamental understanding of the objects in question. 
Id. 
192.  See id. at 1233 (noting the imperfections in the ordinary observer test made it 
inefficient in this case because of the particularly complex subject matter of computer 
programs); Dawson, 905 F.2d at 735 (“[T]he advent of computer programming infringement 
actions has forced courts to recognize that sometimes the non-interested or uninformed lay 
observer simply lacks the necessary expertise to determine similarities or differences between 
product.”). 
193.  See Baxa & Krasilovsky, supra note 189.  
194.  905 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990). 
195.  Id. at 732. 
196.  Id. 
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it.197  When Dawson became aware of this subsequent arrangement, he 
filed suit for copyright infringement.198 
Through the testimony of multiple experts, the district court found 
substantial similarities between the two arrangements under the objective 
component of the Ordinary Observer Analysis.199  When making a 
determination regarding the subjective component, the court noted that the 
expert testimony, which was so persuasive under the objective prong, was 
now “irrelevant to and inadmissible under the second prong to show 
substantial similarity constituting infringement of expression.”200 
The district court did not find subjective similarity because Dawson 
only supplied the sheet music for the two pieces, so the fact finder did not 
have enough evidence to draw from.201  Without more, the fact finder, 
acting as the “ordinary, lay observer,” did not have the necessary 
knowledge about sheet music to detect requisite similarities between the 
works that would constitute unlawful appropriation.202 
The lack of substantial similarity was the issue on appeal.203  Here 
the court adopted the Intended Audience Test as a more accurate measure 
of subjective similarity: 
[A]s demonstrated [by the lower court], obedience to the undisputed 
principles of copyright law and the policy underlying the ordinary 
observer test requires a recognition of the limits of the ordinary lay 
observer characterization of the ordinary observer test.  Those 
principles require orientation of the ordinary observer test to the 
works’ intended audience, permitting an ordinary lay observer 
characterization of the test only where the lay public fairly represents 
the works’ intended audience.204 
The court rationalized the adoption of this standard from the 
methodology used in the hallmark case, Arnstein v. Porter, which stressed 
using the audience for whom the work was created as the most accurate 
gauge of whether the alleged infringer took something of value from the 
copyright holder.205  Using this foundation, but acknowledging the 
classification as the “ordinary, lay listener” may have been overly broad, 
 
197.  Id. 
198.  Id. 
199.  Id. at 733. 
200.  Baxa & Krasilovsky, supra note 189, at 97. 
201.  Dawson, 905 F.2d at 733. 
202.  Id. 
203.  Id. 
204.  Id. 
205.  Id. at 734. 
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the court noted: 
Although Arnstein does not address the question directly, we read the 
case’s logic to require that where the intended audience is significantly 
more specialized than the pool of lay listeners, the reaction of the 
intended audience would be the relevant inquiry.  In light of the 
copyright law’s purpose of protecting a creator’s market, we think it 
sensible to embrace Arnstein’s command that the ultimate comparison 
of the works at issue be oriented towards the works’ intended 
audience.206 
It is here the court shifts the traditional Ordinary Observer Analysis 
to require a deeper intrinsic analysis if the works are directed to a 
narrower, more specialized audience.207  As the court notes, a group 
“familiar with the media at issue” should be the one to make the subjective 
analysis, as utilizing a more educated audience when considering complex 
subject matter avoids infringement cases turning on the opinion of 
someone who is ill-informed to make a subjective determination.208 
B. Dawson’s Limits 
Since the Dawson decision, the Intended Audience Test has been 
applied in a limited number of circumstances.209  Despite the Dawson line 
of reasoning, it is precedent to find the general public as the “intended 
audience,” unless the target audience possesses a specialized expertise or 
specific knowledge of the work that makes its judgment a better measure 
of subjective similarity.210 
Since existing precedent urges courts to consider the general public 
as the appropriate subjective measure, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
declined to apply the Intended Audience Test in a more recent music 
copyright infringement claim.211  In Copeland v. Bieber, musician Devin 
Copeland brought an infringement action against pop stars Usher and 
 
206.  Id. 
207.  Id. at 734–35. 
208.  Id. at 735.  
209.  See Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(finding that where the work is child-oriented, like a costume depicting a life-sized purple 
dinosaur, children are the proper audience to measure intrinsic similarity); see also Kohus v. 
Mariol, 328 F.3d 848 (6th Cir. 2003) (extending the intended audience rule to include highly 
technical patent drawings that would require interpretational guidance for the lay public to 
understand). 
210.  Dawson, 905 F.2d at 737 (“[A] court should be hesitant to find that the lay public 
does not fairly represent a work’s intended audience . . . .  To warrant departure from the lay 
characterization of the ordinary observer test, ‘specialized expertise’ must go beyond mere 
differences in taste and instead must rise to the level of the possession of knowledge that the lay 
public lacks.”). 
211.  Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484 (4th Cir. 2015). 
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Justin Bieber, alleging three versions of their song, “Somebody to Love,” 
infringed on his copyrighted work of the same name.212  On appeal, 
Copeland insisted that a highly specialized group of individuals be 
considered as the “intended audience,” rather than the general public.213  
His argument rested on the fact that his work was meant for industry 
professionals, not the “ordinary observer.”214  However, the Court was not 
convinced industry professionals represented the work’s audience—
focusing only on who would make-up the “buyer” or “recipient” in the 
artist’s market.215 
This Note argues the Fourth Circuit should have found Copeland 
deserving of a specialized group of individuals, and thus, applied the 
Intended Audience Test.  Although not addressed in the opinion, the 
“general public,” while possibly the end recipient of the work, lacked the 
specialized knowledge necessary to make a subjective evaluation in the 
substantial similarity analysis.216  From the time of its creation, the 
Intended Audience Test prevented an uneducated “ordinary observer” 
from making subjective determinations in infringement cases, regardless 
of who was considered the “buyer” of the work.217  Refusing to consider 
the specialized “intended audience” of music industry professionals, the 
Copeland court, caused a musically untrained and uneducated general 
public to make the subjective determination, which greatly affected the 
outcome of the case.218 
IV. UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF MUSIC WARRANT ITS OWN 
SYSTEM 
A wide variety of works are covered under current copyright law, 
 
212.  Id. at 487. 
213.  Id. at 490. 
214.  Id. (“The ‘market’ Copeland was trying to reach, in other words, was the Ushers of 
the world, and Copeland would be harmed if industry professionals believed his song was 
substantially similar to those of the defendants even if the general public saw no resemblance.”); 
see Appellants’ Opening Brief at 30, Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 
2:13-cv-00246-AWA-TEM). 
215.  Copeland, 789 F.3d at 491. 
216.  Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 214, at 30. 
217.  See id. at 29–30.  
[O]nly a reckless indifference to common sense would lead a court to embrace a 
doctrine that requires a copyright case to turn on the opinion of someone who is 
ignorant of the relevant differences and similarities between two works.  Instead, the 
judgment should be informed by people who are familiar with the media at issue.  
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 1990). 
218.  Copeland, 789 F.3d at 494–95 (ruling in favor of the Appellant—even though the 
general public was used as the intended audience—based on a finding that a reasonable jury 
could find intrinsic similarity solely on the similar language in the choruses). 
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and for the sake of uniformity, only one set of laws is imposed on them.219  
However, music deserves its own copyright system, and the current 
application of the test for subjective similarity should be adjusted to better 
represent the functions of music today.  While the “one-size-fits-all” 
formulation of copyright law may have been sufficient throughout history, 
sociological and technological changes in the way people create, listen to, 
and perceive music brings the need for change in the law to the 
forefront.220 
Judicial and legislative bodies controlling how copyright law 
operates are not taking into account the unique cultural and technological 
processes of society’s interaction with music.221  Overlooking these 
distinctive characteristics regarding the public’s production and 
consumption of music, and continuing to broadly categorize it with other 
forms of authorship, creates an outdated and ineffective music copyright 
system.222 
The Intended Audience Test should be applied in all subjective 
determinations of unlawful appropriation in music copyright cases.  Music 
is a highly skilled and technical work of authorship, and the “ordinary 
observer” lacks the knowledge necessary to make accurate determinations 
of unlawful appropriation.223  By adopting the Intended Audience Test in 
music copyright cases, an output of more precise infringement claims will 
result, and the ineffectiveness of the Ordinary Observer Analysis in music 
copyright cases will be combatted.224 
A. The Current System Does Not Account for the Common Practices of 
Music Production 
The current copyright system, and specifically the test for substantial 
similarity, punishes artists for music production resulting from modern 
techniques and practices.225  Since the current system utilizes the 
 
219.  Roodhuyzen, supra note 147, at 1384. 
220.  Keyes, supra note 74. 
221.  Id. at 419. 
222.  Id. at 420; see also Aaron Keyt, An Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism 
Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 421, 424 (1988) (arguing copyright law is a self-perpetuating cycle 
that “work[s] a disservice on unestablished songwriters”). 
223.  Eric Rogers, Substantially Unfair: An Empirical Examination of Copyright 
Substantial Similarity Analysis Among the Federal Circuits, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893, 912–
15 (2013). 
224.  See discussion infra Sections IV.A–C. 
225.  JOANNA DEMERS, STEAL THIS MUSIC: HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
AFFECTS MUSICAL CREATIVITY 4 (The Univ. of Ga. Press, 2006).  
Transformative appropriation, the act of referring to or quoting old works in order to 
create a new work, has always been a key element in thriving musical cultures.  Today, 
appropriation connotes an exclusive or unauthorized seizure of materials.  But 
30 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:001 
subjective measure of the “ordinary observer,” who might be unaware of 
common compositional characteristics of music production, imprecise 
and unfair judicial decisions result.226 
This highly damaging system results in artist liability for simply 
adhering to industry norms.227  The adoption of the Intended Audience 
Test in all music infringement analyses would combat this problem by 
allowing a more skilled and experienced party, who possesses knowledge 
of these production characteristics, to make the subjective determinations 
present in all measures for substantial similarity. 
There is no intent requirement for a copyright infringement action; 
therefore, subconscious copying is actionable.228  Numerous past 
infringement actions demonstrate this phenomenon229—oftentimes 
involving cases where courts feel obligated to find subconscious copying 
simply because they see no other explanation for the similarity.230  The 
basis for this type of infringement liability “seems predicated on the 
notion that copying is copying, whether done intentionally or 
innocently.”231  However, previously explained characteristics of music 
production exemplify why this practice unfairly punishes musicians.232 
Characteristics unique to music production make it “both deserving 
and in need of special consideration.”233  Music borrowing and copying 
between artists, as well as the constraints of musical composition, 
 
transformative appropriation has historically functioned in a spirit of sharing, friendly 
competition, and homage. 
Id. 
226.  See Manta, supra note 127, at 1336–37. 
227.  See DEMERS, supra note 225, at 7.  
228.  Livingston & Urbinato, supra note 94, at 268 (“The defendant’s ‘innocence’ or lack 
of willful intent can certainly shield him from enhanced damages but has no bearing on the 
question of whether he unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s original expression.”). 
229.  See Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (basing 
defendant Bolton’s access to plaintiff’s song, even after denying ever hearing it, on its popularity 
during the 1960s—almost 25 years before Bolton produced his own song); ABKCO Music, Inc. 
v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 999 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding former Beatles member 
liable for infringement even after he presented extensive evidence of the independent production 
of his song, but admitting to hearing plaintiff’s song previously); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. 
Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (believing the defendant did not consciously copy 
elements of plaintiff’s work, Judge Learned Hand felt obligated to impose liability because of 
the virtual identity of a characteristic element of the two works).  
230.  Rebecca Skirpan, An Argument that Independent Creation is as Likely as 
Subconscious Copying in Music Infringement Cases (2013) (unpublished Law Student 
Scholarship, Seton Hall Law), Paper 112, http://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/112. 
231.  Livingston & Urbinato, supra note 94, at 269. 
232.  See supra Subpart I.C. 
233.  Craig & Laroche, supra note 85, at 48.  
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highlight the need for special consideration in terms of copyright 
protection.234  Since copyright law is not in line with these creative 
processes in the music industry, a severely insufficient infringement test 
results.235 
The need for a more tailored infringement analysis is also clear when 
considering the idea-expression dichotomy of copyright protection in the 
context of musical works.236  Unlike literary or poetic works, where 
paraphrasing exact language can express the same idea in a lawful way, 
reformulating musical works to express the same idea without infringing 
expression is close to impossible.237  This idea is emphasized by the finite 
number of pleasing compositions available to musicians, paired with the 
limiting characteristics specific to that artist’s musical genre.238 
Punishing artists for following the common practice of the music 
industry by drawing inspiration and ideas from musical influences is not 
an appropriate system.239  The Intended Audience Test would serve to 
account for these common practices of the music industry because the 
group making the subjective decisions regarding infringement would be 
aware of these characteristics. 
Further, the reason for adopting the Intended Audience Test also 
speaks to the type of illicit copying against which copyright law is meant 
to protect.  In Lyons Partnership v. Morris Costumes, Inc., when 
narrowing the audience to children because of the child-centered nature of 
the work, the court stated the basis for adopting the Intended Audience 
Test is to prevent against “knock-offs,” which could diminish a holder’s 
economic market and potential financial returns.240 
Accounting for the creator’s economic interest in his work makes the 
Intended Audience Test a better measure of when an alleged infringer uses 
a copyrighted work as influence or inspiration versus maliciously aiming 
to gain profits from the copyrighted material.241  Malicious infringement 
should always be punishable.  However, when it comes to music, liability 
for the utilization of influential works creates a system of fearful 
 
234.  Id. 
235.  Id. (“The features of musical culture and the ubiquity of musical borrowing reveal 
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musicians and individuals with a limited number of musical works to 
enjoy.242 
B. The Shift in Music Consumption Causes the “Ordinary Observer” to 
Lack the Adequate Knowledge for Effective Subjective 
Determinations 
Personalized music consumption makes the need for the adoption of 
the Intended Audience Test even more essential.  The growing trend of 
personalized music consumption through on-demand and curated 
streaming services demonstrates the power of digital technology to reach 
more listeners than ever before.243  However, the archaic system of 
copyright law is bogging down the growth of digital music technology.  
Because the current system is outdated and ineffective, it works against 
digital technology by minimizing its impact and limiting creative 
practices.244  As the opportunities created by the ever-expanding digital 
world continue to clash with the traditional norms of copyright law, the 
need for a change is evident.245 
People’s appetite for music consumption has not changed, but the 
way we individually tune into music can be truly unique.246  Listeners can 
access the specific music they want, at the touch of a button: all due to the 
advent of new digital mediums.247  The 2014 boom of music streaming, 
and the continued growth into 2015, highlight how dynamic the music 
landscape truly is.248  There has been a shift away from uniformity of 
music consumption, and an increase in the personalization of the music 
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experience.249 
The more personalized nature of music consumption through online 
streaming platforms greatly limits the music to which the everyday 
listener is exposed.250  Music listeners now can zero-in on their preferred 
taste and exclude the rest.251  This is unlike older mediums, such as radio, 
where the listener is not in control of what is being played, or CDs, where 
the listener was forced to purchase a “prepackaged bunch of songs.”252  
The highly customized nature of the listening experience on sites like 
Spotify creates blinders for the listener to focus solely on their preferred 
genre or style of music.253 
The assumption that the “ordinary observer” or the “general public” 
is the best representation of the intended audience in musical copyright 
infringement cases is inadequate because of today’s expanding digital 
technology.254  With statistics proving the popularity of on-demand 
streaming services, and due to the individualization of music consumption 
achieved through these on-demand streaming services, not every member 
of the public possesses the knowledge to decide what is illicit copying for 
specific types of music.255 
By listening to only what is pleasing to the individual listener, the 
rest of the works in the music landscape go ignored.256  This makes a hip-
hop fan an inadequate measure for unlawful appropriation when it 
involves two works that would fall into the genre of country or electronic 
dance music.257  Each style of music has unique characteristics that only 
avid listeners of that style would be able to distinguish between.258  What 
may sound the same to a non-country fan might be easily recognizable as 
a distinctive musical characteristic to a lover of country music.259 
As a society, we value advances in digital technologies.260  The 
creation of on-demand streaming services has allowed the world of music 
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to advance, and fans to get more out of their listening experience.  
Unfortunately, with those advances, the shift in music consumption has 
created an inadequate “ordinary observer.”  To better cater to a world of 
on-demand streaming, the Intended Audience Test should be adopted in 
all music infringement cases.  With the adaptation of a more effective 
copyright system, technology’s power and reach will continue to 
prosper.261 
C. Extending the Intended Audience Test for Musical Works to Better 
Promote the Main Purpose of Copyright Law 
The Intended Audience Test would better support the purpose of 
copyright law if applied to all music infringement cases.  As previously 
explained, there are two competing interests of copyright law—granting 
creators rights over their works and the utilitarian function to benefit the 
public domain.262  However, copyright jurisprudence is clear that a benefit 
to the public domain, with a constant flow of creative works, always 
outweighs the former.263 
The current Ordinary Observer Analysis applied in music 
infringement cases results in misguided and inaccurate subjective 
determinations of substantial similarity, which can eventually have 
disastrous effects on the number of creative works produced for the public 
domain.264  For example, a 2014 study measured the factors used by the 
fact-finder, acting as the “ordinary observer,” when making the subjective 
determination in infringement cases.265  The study hypothesized that when 
given additional information regarding the works and the creators’ efforts, 
as well as identifying one party as the “wrongdoer,” the “ordinary 
observer” found more similarities and less dissimilarities resulting in 
greater plaintiff-friendly results.266  The result suggests the “ordinary 
observer” is in fact sensitive to additional information presented to him, 
and as a result, his subjective determination is subject to multiple 
cognitive and moral biases.267  This shows the “ordinary observer” has the 
potential to make inaccurate findings on substantial similarity.268 
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This study also detailed the extensive process the “ordinary 
observer” embarks on when making subjective determinations.269  First, 
one must determine the similarities and dissimilarities between the two 
works.270  Despite seeming fairly straightforward, the “ordinary observer” 
oftentimes requires more background knowledge to recognize the ways in 
which the works are either similar or dissimilar, making the process quite 
complex.271  Further, the nature of the discretion that goes into making a 
subjective determination of what is “substantial” enough similarity creates 
deviations in the standard being applied.272  In short, the nature of this 
subjective analysis creates inconsistent results because the process is 
inherently complex and prone to personal biases.273 
Aside from inaccurate findings of substantial similarity based on 
inevitable biases, the lay observer often lacks knowledge regarding the 
complexities of musical composition, allowing for injudicious subjective 
analyses.274  For example, due to society’s aural appreciation of music, 
hearing-based evaluations can dominate subjective determinations and 
confuse an actual finding of infringing expression with what might just 
sound the same.275  Another musical hurdle for the “ordinary observer” is 
deciding if what is musically similar is inherent due to the subject matter, 
or if it actually amounts to appropriation of copyrighted material.276  For 
example, many phrases in rock songs end with a “cadence” to finish off 
the musical phrase and connect it smoothly with the next.277  Without a 
foundational knowledge of rock music composition, the “ordinary 
observer” may find similarities in the cadence of two rock songs—a well-
known characteristic to musicians and industry professionals—and use it 
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as a basis for finding substantial similarity.278 
With an influx of plaintiff-friendly decisions regarding substantial 
similarity, secondary musicians are unfairly accused for unlawful 
copying.279  This could discourage the wrongfully accused, as well as 
other musicians afraid of liability, from creating new music—especially 
music inspired by past musical works.280  Also, in the long term, this 
system creates a lower quality of musical works in the public domain 
because new works lack the inspirations and influences due to the 
creators’ fears of copyright liability.281 
Finding substantial similarity within the specificities and 
technicalities of musical composition is a task too burdensome for the 
“ordinary observer” to bear.282  When a court utilizes the Intended 
Audience Test rather than the traditional Ordinary Observer Analysis, a 
presumption of higher skill and expertise regarding the subject matter of 
the works at issue exists.283  This means the designated “intended 
audience” will find similarities where the “ordinary observer” will not, 
and is better qualified to determine if those similarities are the kind that 
warrants a finding of unlawful appropriation.284 
Erroneous infringement analyses by the “ordinary observer” hinder 
the core purpose of copyright law by unduly restricting the creative 
process.285  Reliance on the subjective findings of an “ordinary observer” 
risks over-inclusion of creative works meant for the public domain under 
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the umbrella protection of copyright law—a grave policy concern for this 
area of law.286 
Also, more consistent and accurate holdings would put litigants, 
judges, and critics of the current system at ease.  Adopting the Intended 
Audience Test in music infringement cases will not only provide more 
accurate subjective determinations of substantial similarity, but also 
increase the number and quality of musical works in the public domain.287  
It will better promote copyright law’s ultimate goal—enriching the public 
domain with quality musical works. 
CONCLUSION 
Imagine a world without music.  Silence would ring down the aisles 
as you grocery shop on Sunday mornings.  Pianos would only serve as 
overly elaborate coffee tables.  Without musical cues, moviegoers would 
be unable to detect dramatic moments.  Music infiltrates almost every 
facet of our world.  The law must promote as much of this creative spirit 
as possible.  However, as the current copyright system stands, the law 
cultivates the opposite effect. 
Due to its unique production characteristics, music creation is 
different from any other form of authorship—warranting a specialized test 
for infringement.  Further, as technology continues to break new ground, 
music discovery and consumption are shifting to a more online platform.  
While the growth of on-demand streaming services has dramatically 
changed the music experience for listeners, the test for copyright 
infringement has lagged behind. 
The greatest concern under the current copyright regime is that by 
continuing to utilize the “ordinary observer” as the subjective measure for 
unlawful appropriation, the copyright system produces inaccurate 
infringement results.  By unfairly punishing musicians, a sense of fear is 
created—fear that by trying to represent an era of music and paying 
homage to a legendary musician, such as the case with “Blurred Lines,” 
an artist opens himself up to the possibility of grave copyright liability.  
The current copyright system jeopardizes the future of music creation. 
Similar to the decision in Copeland v. Bieber,288 courts are often 
reluctant when confronted with the opportunity to apply the Intended 
Audience Test to music infringement cases.  The creation of the Intended 
Audience Test for software infringement analyses, as well as the extension 
of the test to other forms of authorship, exemplifies situations where the 
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need for specialization and expertise in the subjective measure for 
unlawful appropriation is necessary.  By adopting the Intended Audience 
Test a more specialized group would decide the subjective measure 
required in the substantial similarity analysis.  This will result in a 
heightened standard of analysis for infringement cases, and produce more 
accurate and efficient results.  Musicians will be able to create without 
fear of liability, and the quality of music in the public domain would 
increase significantly. 
 
